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Competitive Equilibrium Hyperinflation under Rational Expectations 
Fernando de Holanda Barbosa
* 





  Cagan’s (1956) seminal work provided the first attempt to explain the 
hyperinflation phenomenom. That essay was so influential that small variations of Cagan’s 
model can be found in several textbooks such as Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (1996), Romer (2001) and Sargent (1987). 
  Cagan’s model is capable of generating hyperinflation under two types of 
expectation mechanisms: adaptive and rational. Both mechanisms have the same reduced 
form. Both are unsatisfactory because adaptive expectations yield systematic forecasting 
errors, while rational expectations need to be combined with a partial adjustment 
mechanism in the monetary market. Moreover, either mechanism requires violation of the 
government budget constraint to generate a hyperinflation. That is, in Cagan’s model, a 
hyperinflation is not a competitive equilbrium outcome. 
  Marcet and Nicolini (2003) adopted a simple monetary model composed by a 
money demand equation, a government budget constraint and an exchange rate rule. They 
assumed that agents in the model were boundedly rational. They showed that such a model 
could generate recurrent episodes of high inflation, as observed in several Latin American 
countries in the eighties and nineties. Zarazaga (1993) obtained similar results in a game 
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theoretical setup. He assumed that players did not have full information on the distribution 
of the seignorage proceeds. 
  We summarize the current knowledge on hyperinflaton in the following way. In 
standard macro models, it is necessary to impose a deviation from rational expectations 
and/or to violate the government budget constraint for the model to generate 
hyperinflation. In other types of models, the hyperinflation may arise as a consequence of 
agents not being fully informed. 
  The main contribution of this paper is to show that a standard macroeconomic 
model with rational expectations is capable of displaying a hyperinflation as a competitive 
equilibrium outcome. To achieve that result, we introduced two major features in our 
model: a fiscal crisis that requires printing money to finance an increasing public deficit 
and a predicted change in an unsustainable fiscal regime. 
  One of the features of Cagan’s model that, under our point of view, contributed to 
its long lasting influence is the fact that its solution provides an unbounded path for the 
inflation rate. Clearly, an inflation path that diverges to infinite will qualify as a 
hyperinflation process under any sounding definition of hyperinflation. 
  Neither Marcet and Nicolini (2003) nor Zarazaga (1993) models display an 
explosive inflation trajectory as an equilibrium outcome. This is not necessarily the case in 
our model. If the demand for money is inelastic with respect to the nominal interest rate, 
then the competitive equilibrium of our model may display an explosive inflation path. 
  We want to emphasize that our model is consistent with several hyperinflation 
stylized facts. Namely, the model is able to match the following features: 
1.  the real stock of money approaches zero;  
2.  the rate of inflation grows unboundedly;  
3.  the public deficit is financed by issuing money;  4
4.  hyperinflation duration is variable and depends on the fiscal conditions of each 
experience; 
5.  hyperinflation stops overnight through a change in the monetary policy regime.
1  
  The fiscal crisis is the source of hyperinflation and we may paraphrase Friedman 
[(1970), p.25] and state that hyperinflation is always and everywhere a fiscal phenomenon, 
in the sense that a hyperinflation caused by a bubble has not been observed. The fiscal 
crisis is taken as given and there will be no attempt in this paper to explain the reasons that 
led a society to choose such a course of action. There is no doubt that institutions as well 
as economic policies should be explained by economic theory, since they are the outcome 
of choices and interaction among different groups of the society. This topic, however, is in 
the realm of political economy and will not be addressed here. The public knows that the 
intertemporal government budget constraint, under this fiscal crisis, is not sustainable in 
the long run and therefore expects a policy regime switch to occur in the near future. 
Before turning to the theory, let us comment on three important points made by 
Cagan that has shaped both the empirical and theoretical studies on hyperinflation. First, 
Cagan’s demand function for real cash balances yields a rate of inflation that maximizes 
inflation tax revenue. He observed that the average rate of rise in prices in the experiences 
he examined were well above the constant rates that would have maximized inflation tax 
revenue. This puzzle led several researchers (e.g. Bruno and Fischer (1990); Sargent and 
Wallace (1987)) to suggest solutions that could help understand the reasons why the 
government was operating on the wrong side of the Laffer curve. This puzzle may indeed 
be a pure statistical artifact implied by his maintained hypothesis. In the model we work 
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out in this paper there is no such a puzzle because we are not convinced that Cagan’s 
functional form is a stylized fact of hyperinflation experiences.  
Secondly, Cagan (1956, pp. 77/78) remarked that “In the unsettled conditions 
following the two world wars, governments were too weak to enact adequate tax programs 
and to administer them effectively. Issuing money was a method of raising revenue...[that] 
does not require detailed legislation and can be administerd very simply”. This statement is 
a good description of the fiscal crisis that underlies every hyperinflation, but previous 
works were not able to deal with it in a proper framework because they took this statement 
at face value. This paper interprets the fiscal crisis as the infeasibility of the intertemporal 
government budget constraint in the long run, under the economic policy regime in place 
and it shows that the inflation rates observed in hyperinflation experiences do not attain 
the maximum of inflation tax revenue that could be collected from society. 
Thirdly, Cagan excluded some of the observations near the end of the 
hyperinflations because they could not be fitted by his model. He offered two hypotheses 
to explain these observations. The first assumes that individuals expect a currency reform, 
so prices would not go on rising for long, and they would hold more cash balances than the 
amount predicted by his demand for money equation. Flood and Garber (1980) pursued 
this hypothesis and they developed a theory of monetary reform. However, their model 
lacks microfoundations, e.g., the expected rate of inflation (the opportunity cost of holding 
money) is affected by the incoming monetary reform but this premium on the currency 
reform is not derived from first principles. The second hypothesis suggested by Cagan to 
explain the failure of his equation to account for the final months of some hyperinflations 
was that the data would not conform to his functional form. The model to be presented in 
this paper follows Cagan’s second hypothesis, but also takes into consideration the fact 
that individuals in a hyperinflation environment knows that a currency reform will occur in  6
the near future. The fact that the public expects a regime switch does not need to imply 
that the opportunity cost of holding money decreases as the time of the currency reform 
gets closer, since the interest rate does not necessarily have to include a premium on the 
currency reform.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of Cagan’s model 
and some of its underlying hypotheses that have been overlooked in the literature. Section 
3 presents a theoretical model that yields a competitive equilibrium hyperinflation path. 
Section 4 presents the solution of that model. Section 5 concludes. Technical issues are 
discussed in Appendixes A, B and C. 
 
2. CAGAN’S MODEL OF HYPERINFLATION 
 
Four equations constitute Cagan’s famous model: 
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The first equation states that the public deficit f is financed by issuing money; the second is 
the demand for money where the real quantity of money m(=M/P) depends on the 
expected rate of inflation 
e π  according to a semi-logarithmic functional form; the third is 
the adaptive expectation mechanism, and the fourth equation stands for the fiscal crisis. By 
taking derivatives of the second equation with respect to time, and taking into account the 
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Figure 1 
The inflation tax revenue τ (m) results from multiplying the inflation rate (π ) by the 
real quantity of money (m): 
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The derivatives of τ (m) with respect to m are 

























This inequality assumes that 1- 0 > β α , otherwise hyperinflation would not be feasible. 
Thus, the inflation tax function is convex, with a minimum at m* =   exp(k-1), and it 
increases when m approaches to zero.
2 Figure 1 shows that the inflation tax function has a 
U shape. This function is completely different from the bell shaped Laffer curve of 
Cagan’s demand for money functional form, when the expected rate of inflation is equal to 
the actual rate of inflation. 
By combining the inflation tax revenue function with the first equation of Cagan’s 
model we get the nonlinear differential equation: 
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  This model yields a hyperinflation path when the fiscal crisis function f(t) has the 
following specification, 



























     
where  0 t  is the time that hyperinflation begins. The phase diagram of Figure 2 gives the 
graphic solution of the differential equation, and shows the dynamics of hyperinflation. 
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Before the fiscal crisis, the economy is in equilibrium at point A. When the public deficit 
to be financed by money increases from fo    to  f , the economy jumps to point B, and 
enters a hyperinflation path. 
 
 









As shown in Figure 1, inflation tax revenue increases and goes to a finite number 
when the real quantity of money approaches zero. Therefore, Cagan had implicitly 
assumed that real quantity of money was an inelastic function of the observed inflation 
rate. We show in Appendix C that the ability of the model to generate an unbounded path 
for the inflation depends on the hypothesis that the demand for real balances is inelastic 
with respect to the interest rate. 
 
3. HYPERINFLATION: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Hyperinflation is seen by the public to be unsustainable in the long run at least for 
two reasons. First, if the fiscal regime goes on forever it violates the intertemporal budget 
constraint of the government. Second, because money is essential to the functioning of the  10
economy. Therefore, the public predicts that at some point in the near future a stabilization 
program will stop the hyperinflation process. However, the timing of the stabilization is 
unknown and to deal with this fact the model has to be stochastic. Thus, the probability 
mechanism of a regime change belongs to the information set of the representative agent. 
This uncertainty will be described by the distribution function F(t), which gives to each 
instant t the probability that a policy regime switch will occur before or at that moment t.  
The public knows that the switch will occur at most at the instant  h t . Thus, the 
distribution function F(t) is defined on the interval [0, h t ]. To make the exposition easier, 
we assume that  h t  is exogenous. In Appendix C we extend the analysis to the case in 
which  h t  is endogenous. 
The economic policy regime switch anticipated by the public will have the 
following characteristics: i) the central bank will stop issuing money to finance the public 
deficit; ii) the level of government expenditures will remain the same and will be financed 
by lump sum taxes; iii) the price level will be stabilized and the central bank will increase 
the stock of money once and for all at the moment of stabilization, and then iv) the central 
bank will hold the stock of money constant afterwards. 
Thus, the nominal stock of money at the moment of stabilization T is given by, 
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where M(x) is the stock of money at the instant x, z(x) is the additional flow of money at 
period x, and  ) (T M ∆ is the once and for all increase in the stock of money at the moment 
of stabilization. The representative agent maximizes the expected value of the discounted 
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flow of utilities, 
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where ρ  is the rate of time preference, the utility function depends on consumption (c) and 
the services provided by money (m=M/P , M is the nominal stock of money and P is the 
price index),  and a subscript s on a function denotes its value after stabilization has taken 
place. We assume that the representative agent has constant levels of consumption and real 
stock of money from the point of stabilization onward. The functions u(c) and v(m) are 
concave and have the traditional properties. The agent maximizes (1) subject to the flow 
restriction, 
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and the stock restriction, 
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where  , , 1 ) ( , , 0 ) ( T t if t D or T t if t D = = ≠ = τ is a lump sum tax, c is consumption, y is 
real income and  ) (T τ ∆  is the transfer made by the government at stabilization time. 
The solution to this problem (see Appendix A and Drazen and Helpman (1990), 
and the references cited there, for more details), show that at each moment before the 
policy regime switch takes place, the nominal rate of interest is equal to the marginal rate 
of substitution of consumption for money, 
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situations where monetary and fiscal policies are known to be not sustainable in the long run. However, they 
did not use their framework to provide a model of hyperinflation as done in this paper.  12







                                                   (4) 
 
When there is uncertainty about the timing of a regime change the interest rate may 
include a risk premium. If at the time of stabilization the price level would be allowed to 
have a downward jump, for example, the agent would expect a capital gain and the risk 
premium would be negative. If at the time of stabilization government spending would be 
cut, consumption would increase, the marginal utility of consumption decreases, and the 
rate of interest would include a positive risk premium.
4 There is no interest rate risk 
premium in equation (4) because the stabilization program will allow neither a price jump 
nor a change in the flow of consumption. 
  The market for goods and services is in equilibrium when output is equal to the 
sum of consumption and government (g) expenditures: 
                                                              y = c + g                                                               
  The government finances its constant level of expenditures through a lump sum tax 
and issuing money: 
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4 The analysis of this case will not be pursued here, since the qualitative results would not change.  13
  The public deficit, financed by isssuing money, increases through time according 
to: 
5 
                           s f t f g f f t f f t > = ≤ > = ∞ → ) ( lim , , 0 ), ( &                                 
 
We assume that the deficit to be financed by money can be at most equal to the level of 
government expenditures. The last inequality in the expression above characterizes the 
fiscal crisis. It says that as time goes by, the fiscal deficit to be financed by money 
becomes larger than the maximum amount of inflation tax  ) ( s that can be collected from 
society. 
 
4. MODEL SOLUTION 
 
  The economic model can be summed up by the following system of four equations: 
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the complete atrophy of the fiscal system (sic). In the last decade of that month the ordinary receipts covered 
about 0.8 per cent of the expenses; the State now obtained money exclusively through the discount of 
Treasury bills.”  14
In the first equation, the public deficit is financed by money; in the second equation, the 
demand for money is written in implicit form; in the third, the Fisher equation is stated; in 
the fourth, the public deficit financed by money changes through time according to the 
function f(t), which tries to capture the fiscal crisis. By combining equations (5), (6), (7) 
and (8) we get: 
                                          T t if m s t f mr f m m < − = − = − , ) ( ) ( ρ &                                (9) 
 
This differential equation can be written as, 
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which is the intertemporal government budget constraint, and  ) ( − T m is the real quantity of 
money just before stabilization takes place. The function s(m) measures the cost of money 
services: 
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We assume that the money demand equation has interest rate elasticity, in absolute 
value, between zero and one. As discussed in Barbosa and Cunha (2003), this hypothesis 
implies that  0 ) ( lim
0 > ′ + → m v m
m . Hence, s(m) must satisfy the following properties on 
the function s(m):  () . 0 ' ) , 0 ) ( lim )
0 ≤ > =
→ m s b s m s a
m The first says that the inflation tax 
(mπ ) goes to a positive value when the real quantity of money approaches zero. The second 
condition assumes that the cost of money services increases when the real quantity of  15
money decreases. As a consequence, as the real balances goes to zero the inflation tax is 
bounded away from zero. In fact, equations (6) and (7) imply that 
) ( ) ( ) ( c u m m m v m ′ + = ′ π ρ . In Appendix C we relax the hypothesis that the money 
demand is inelastic with respect to the nominal interest rate. 
Before we provide a general solution to the model it will be interesting to analyse 
the particular case where the public deficit to be financed by money is constant, which has 
been the usual situation considered in the literature (see Bruno and Fischer (1990), Kiguel 
(1989), Romer (2001), Sargent and Wallace (1987)). Under this assumption the 
differential equation (9) has the phase diagram of Figure 3, since 
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In this diagram, we examine three hypotheses. The first (AA) supposes that the public 
deficit to be financed by money is less than the maximum value of the services provided 
by money. The model has a steady-state equilibrium where the inflation rate is constant. 
The second hypothesis (OB) assumes that the public deficit to be financed by money is 
equal to the limit of the function s(m) when the real quantity of money approaches zero. 
The model now has a hyperinflation steady-state equilibrium. The third hypothesis (CC) 
presupposes that the public deficit to be financed by money is greater than the maximum 
of the value of the services provided by money. The economic agents know this fact 
beforehand and they will try to get rid immediately of the stock of money they hold. Thus, 
the model yields hyperinflation, which is not a steady-state equilibrium.  
  We may conclude that a constant public deficit to be financed by money can yield 
hyperinflation. However, this condition cannot bring about a hyperinflation path, but only  16
an instantaneous hyperinflation. This fact has not been observed in hyperinflation 
experiences that have occurred in the past century. Furthermore, there is no evidence that a 
constant public deficit to be financed by money should be a good working hypothesis (see 
Note 5). 
  The nonautonomous differential equation (9) is nonlinear. From a mathematical 
point of view it is convenient to define the function s(m) for all real numbers, and not only 
for nonnegative numbers, such as  m s m s δ − ≥ ) (  for  0 ≤ m , where s’(0)=-δ≤  0. When 
0 = m & , we define mt according to, 
                                              0 ) ( ) ( = − + t t m s t f m ρ                                                           
 
and by the implicit function theorem it follows that 
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empirical question. Thus, other shapes could be used instead of the one we use in Figure 1.  17
Thus,  t m is a nonincreasing function and  m mt t =
∞ → lim , where  () 0 = − + m s f m ρ . The 
value of m  can be positive, zero or negative. Let us analyze the last case because it yields 
hyperinflation paths that correspond to real world experiences. Figure 4 is a phase diagram 
that represents the solution of the nonautonomous differential equation (9), and we will be 
able through the variable  t m to partition the phase space into regions in which the real 
stock of money decreases or increases over time. Therefore, Figure 4 denotes paths of the 
real quantity of money against time and it shows the case when  0 < m . The curve mt 
divides the plane into two regions, in the upper part the real stock of money increases 
() 0 > m &  and in the lower part it decreases () 0 < m & . 
  The hyperinflation path must be consistent with the monetary reform ocurring at 
the last moment. Thus, the initial value of the real quantity of money ( ) 0 ( m ) is the same 
regardless of the uncertain timing of the monetary reform (see Appendix B for details). 
The diagram of Figure 4 describes a situation where hyperinflation lasts the maximum 
amount of time that the fiscal situation allows. The hyperinflation path of Figure 4 that 
ends at  h t , corresponds to the path HH of the phase diagram of Figure 3.The curve AA now 
correponds to the initial fiscal deficit f(0), 0B to the maximum amount of inflation tax that 
can be collected and CC corresponds to 
−
= ∞ f f ) ( . Given the initial real quantity of 
money m(0), the curve AA shows that the change of the real quantity of money is negative 
at the beginning of the fiscal crisis. Thus, the real quantity of money decreases. The deficit 
financed issuing money increases shifting the AA curve towards the origin and the 
economy moves along the HH path. The end of hyperinflation may occur before HH cuts 
the vertical axis (earlier than  h t ), since the timing of the regime switch is unpredictable.  18
However, the dynamics of hyperinflation will follow the path described above until the 




  No currently available model in the literature can provide an equilibrium 
hyperinflation without departing from rational expectations and/or fully informed agents. 
We have shown in this paper that the hyperinflation phenomenon is consistent with a 
competitive equilibrium with rational expectations and complete information. The driving 
force behind that result is an increasing fiscal deficit to be financed by issuing money. The 
public knows beforehand that the economic policy regime will break down since the fiscal 
crisis is not tenable. Despite anticipating a possibly unbounded path for the inflaton rate, 
people optimally choose to carry a small, but positive, amount of money. 
  Some implications of our model are consistent with the facts observed in several 
hyperinflation experiences during the twentieth century. Among them are: a) 
hyperinflation duration depends upon the degree and velocity of the fiscal crisis, on the 
maximum amount the economy can collect from inflation tax and on the real rate of 
interest; b) inflation inertia is caused only by the inertia of the fiscal crisis; c) the end of 
the hyperinflation occurs before the deficit financed issuing money reaches the maximum 
value of the inflation tax; d) the hyperinflation path is such that at the moment that the real 
stock of money approaches zero (m →  0), its rate of change is negative() 0 < m & . 
The theory of hyperinflation presented in this paper can address the issue of 
defining hyperinflation, where there is no need for an arbitrary threshold inflation rate as in 
Cagan’s classical definition. Hyperinflation will be defined as beginning in the month 
where the intertemporal budget constraint is not sustainable, conditional on no change in  19
the economic policy regime and as ending in the month where this constraint is satisfied. 
Recent research developed to test the sustainability of the public debt can be applied to 
examine the question that is at the core of hyperinflation: does the size of the government 
deficit to be financed by money imply that the intertemporal budget constraint is not 





  We consider an economy in which a representative agent maximizes the discounted 
flow of utility (1), with respect to the variables c, z, M and ∆ M(T), subject to the 
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where  ) (t λ and  ) (t γ  are Lagrange multipliers for each restriction. The first order 
conditions are given by: 
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7 See, for example, Trehan and Walsh (1991) for applications of these tests to U.S. federal budget and 
current account deficits.  20
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  It follows from equations (A1) and (A2) that: 
 
  () () t t u e
t λ
ρ = ′










The derivative of (A3) with respect to time, taking into account these two last expressions 


































Since  () () ρ = ′ ′ t u t v s s / , we may conclude that the nominal rate of interest is equal to the 
marginal rate of substitution of consumption for money: 
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Consider the differential equation (10). Setting t = 0, T = th and using the fact that m(t) →  
0 as t →  th , t < th , one obtains  21
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ρ Using this equality and the 
definition of s(m), it is possible to rewrite (B1) as  
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This equation should pin down both m(0) and the entire path m(t) for t ∈  [0,T]. The 
properties of the function v determine whether the solution is unique or not. We will 
provide an example with a single solution and another one with a continuum of solutions.  
 Assume  that  v(m) = logm. For this particular v, the solution is unique. To verify 
this, observe that (B2) becomes 
 
                                         .   ) (
~
  ) 1 (
) (
1
) 0 ( h








                                             (B3) 
This equation uniquely determines m(0). To see that the path m(t) is unique too, it suffices 
to observe that the same procedure used to determine m(0) also yields a unique value for m 
at any date t > 0. In other words, equation (B2) must also hold if 0 is replaced by a generic 
date t. The solution is unique in the previous example because mv’(m) is constant (i.e., the 
cost of money services is constant). 
  Consider the case in which v(m) = logm + 2m
0.5 and th = 1. Equation (B2) becomes  
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Assume that  
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Let a be a number belonging to (0,1) and m0 any positive number. Consider the path  
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2
0
a t m t m − =                                                          (B6) 
Observe that m(0) = m0 and m(1-) = 0. It will be shown that (B6) provides uncountable 
many solutions for (B4). Fix a. From (B4), construct the equation 
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which obviously comes from (B7). Constraint (B5) ensures that it has at least one positive 
real root. So, for any fixed a, there exists a value for m0 that will yield a solution for (B4). 
Since a can be any number on (0,1), there are uncountable solutions for (B4). 
  It should be emphasized that constraint (B5) was imposed to ensure existence of 
the solution, not to ensure multiplicity. In other words, given the existence, non-
uniqueness naturally arises. When the model has multiple solutions several possibilities  23










where M0 is the exogenous initial nominal stock of money. That amounts to say that the 
initial price level is not allowed to jump at the moment people learn that the economy 




  In this Appendix we discuss some technical issues we have not gone through so 
far. For a while, we will stick to the assumption that the money demand is inelastic with 
respect to the interest rate. 
  As previously mentioned, we want our model to yield a hyperinflation path without 
violating the government budget constraint. We implicitly assume that there exists a path 
for m that respects (B1), so that our exercise is not an empty one. 
  If no such path existed, we could still relax the hyphotesis that the initial price level 
p(0) is exogenous and let it increase (so that the initial value of the real balances would 
fall) up to the point that was possible to find a path for m to balance the government 
budget. In other words, we want f, v and u be such that the set of functions m(⋅ ) that 
satisfies  
                                                0 )] ( )) ( ( [
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− dt t f t m s e
h t t ρ                                              (C1) 
is not empty. Since s is positive, it is clear that for f sufficiently low there will be such an 
m(⋅ ).  24
  Constraint (C1) is required to ensure that the government can balance its budget. 
However, to ensure that the model generates a hyperinflation path another condition is 
required. Namely, we need to ensure that terminal inflation tax can finance terminal fiscal 
deficit and a decrease in real balance. 
  As shown in Barbosa e Cunha (2003), if the money demand is inelastic with 
respect to r, then money is essential. That is,  0 ) ( lim
0 > ′ + → m v m
m . Now, use equation (6) 
to define π  as function of m. This procedure allows us to write the inflation tax as  
                                                           m
c u
m v m
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From the government flow budget constraint (5), it is easy to verify that as m decreases to 
zero, it must be the case that  ) ( ) ( ) ( t m t t f π < . Combining this last fact with the above 
equality, we conclude that the condition 













                                        (C2) 
must hold for the model to display a hyperinflation path.  
  We now relax the hypothesis that money demand is inelastic with respect to the 
nominal interest rate. Condition (C1) is still needed to ensure that the government balances 
its budget.  
  An important difference that arises when we remove our hypothesis on the money 
demand elasticity is the shape of the curve mt in Figure 4. It is not possible to ensure that 
this curve is decreasing with respect to time. However, it still is possible for the model to 
display an increasing inflation path. A necessary condition for this is 
 






0 < m &









  Figure 5 illustrates the solution of the model. Constraint (C3) ensures that m(0) is 
above the intercept A. The solution path for m is given by the curve m(t). Observe that at 
date t* we have  0 = m &  and for larger dates,  0 > m & . So, inflation would be decreasing after 
date t*. To avoid this, we need a requirement similar to constraint (C2).  
 Let  δ  be the distance between the point A and the locus mt (see Figure 5). We 
require that the terminal date th not to be very large. In other words, th must satisfy the 
boundedness constraint 
                                            {} δ π < − <
≥ ) 0 ( : ) ( inf ) (
0 m m m m t f
m h .                                     (C4) 
 
This constraint ensures that the solution must satisfy the condition  ) ( ) ( ) ( t m t t f π < . So, 
the government budget constraint (5) implies  0 < m &  and the inflation is increasing. In 
other words, constraint (C4) guarantees that real balance path does not intersect the 
threshold mt before th.  26
  An important difference from the above solution and the one for the case in which 
the money demand is inelastic with respect to the interest rate is the value of the real 




 is positive. 
Hence, the inflation does not diverge to infinite. 
  Assuming that the money demand is interest-rate inelastic indeed generates a more 
elegant solution, since that hypothesis allows inflation to explode in finite time. However, 
we would like to emphasize that all hyperinflation episodes in history ended while the 
inflation was still bounded. Hence, to account for the observed hyperinflation phenomena 
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